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industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power. We show
that licensing in the downstream industry can make the upstream industry more
competitive. However, licensing in the downstream industry is profitable if and only
if licensing changes the concentration in the upstream industry. We also show that
a monopolist in the final goods market has the incentive for licensing if licensing
changes the market structure of the upstream industry.
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The existing vast literature on technology licensing in imperfectly competitive markets 
mainly address the issues such as the feasibility of technology licensing, the quality of 
the transferred technology, optimal patent licensing contract, the concentration effects of 
technology licensing, effects of licensing on government policies, role of product 
differentiation and pre-commitment strategies on technology licensing. While some of 
the previous works have considered the situations where licenser and licensee do not 
compete in the same market, others have focused on the situations where licenser and 
licensee compete in the same market. Sufficient attention has also been paid to see the 
importance of informational structure on licensing. For a representative sample, one 
may look at Gallini and Winter (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Rockett (1990a, b), 
Gallini and Wright (1990), Marjit (1990), Beggs (1992), Kamien and Tauman (1986), 
Kabiraj and Marjit (1992, 1993, 2002), Kamien et al. (1992), Kabiraj (1994), Bousquet 
et al. (1998), Mukherjee (2001, 2002), Mukherjee and balasubramanian (2001), Schmitz 
(2002).
1 Surprisingly previous works have ignored the importance of vertically 
separated industries on technology licensing. The results of the previous papers will 
hold in a vertically separated industry with competitive upstream industry, but are not 
suitable for industries where the upstream firms have significant market power. 
  The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. We examine the role 
of technology licensing in a vertically separated industry when the upstream firms have 
market power. Particularly, we show that the structure of upstream industry has 
important implications for a profitable licensing in the downstream industry. We find 
that technology licensing in the downstream industry influences and also influenced by 
the market structure of the upstream industry.  
  In what follows, in the next section we consider an economy with downstream 
and upstream industry. There are Cournot duopolists in the downstream industry who 
buys input for their production from the upstream industry. One of these firms in the 
downstream industry is technologically superior compared to its competitor. There is an 
incumbent input supplier and a potential entrant in the upstream industry. While the 
production technologies of the upstream firms are same, the entrant in the upstream 
industry needs to incur an entry cost. In case of entry in the upstream industry, we 
consider that the input suppliers compete like Cournot duopolists.
2 In this framework, 
we examine the profitability of licensing contract with up-front fixed fee. As already 
noted in the literature, the possibility of imitation or inventing around the technology 
easily by the licensee after getting the licensed technology or lack of information needed 
                                                 
1 For surveys, one may look at Reinganum (1989) and Kamien (1992). 
2 Researchers have already focused on successive Cournot oligopolies in different contexts. For example, 
one may look at Abiru (1988), Salinger (1988), Abiru et al. (1998) and Desquilbet and Guyomard (1999).   2
for a royalty provision may be the reason for licensing contract with up-front fixed fee 
only (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and Rockett, 1990). 
  Licensing in the downstream industry increases the derived demand for input as 
well as the profits of the upstream firms. Thus, licensing in the downstream industry 
increases the possibility of entry in the upstream firm. 
If licensing occurs in the downstream industry then it increases the cost 
efficiency of the licensee and also increases competition faced by the licenser for a 
given input price. However, if the market structure of the upstream industry remains 
unchanged due to licensing in the downstream industry then input prices increases under 
licensing. This increment in input prices reduces the profitability of the downstream 
firms. The effect of higher input prices and higher competition faced by the licenser 
outweighs the positive effect of cost efficiency in the licensee’s firm. As a result, 
licensing is not optimal if licensing in the downstream industry does not change the 
market structure in the upstream industry. 
If licensing in the downstream industry enhances competition in the upstream 
industry, we find that licensing is always profitable in the downstream industry. There 
could be situations where upstream industry becomes a monopoly in absence of 
licensing in the downstream industry and a duopoly in case of licensing in the 
downstream industry. In that case, licensing helps to reduce input price. This lower 
input price under licensing along with the effect of cost efficiency in the licensee’s firm 
outweighs the negative impact of higher competition faced by the licenser. Therefore, 
licensing is always profitable where licensing changes the market structure of the 
upstream industry from monopoly to duopoly. 
We show that licensing is profitable even if the downstream firm is the 
monopoly without licensing. Even if licensing encourages competition in the 
downstream industry, it helps to reduce input price when licensing in the downstream 
industry encourages entry in the upstream industry. Thus, it shows that a monopolist in 
the final goods market has the incentive to increase competition in the downstream 
industry by providing license to the technologically inefficient firms if licensing helps to 
enhance competition in the upstream industry. Higher competition in the upstream 
industry will reduce input price and will make licensing profitable. Hence, this result is 
in sharp contrast to the previous literature where a firm behaving as a monopolist or 
near monopolist in the product market does not provide license to the technologically 
inefficient competitor (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Marjit, 1990 and Mukherjee, 
2001).  
Thus, we show that when the upstream firms have significant market power then 
it creates upward bias and downward bias on licensing compared to the situation where 
the upstream industry is competitive. Whether market power of the upstream firms will 
create upward or down ward bias on licensing depends on the influence of licensing on 
the upstream market structure. Thus, unlike the previous contribution on licensing (see,  3
e.g., Schmitz, 2002), we show the possibility of both upward and downward bias on 
licensing and also without informational problem.
3 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the model 
and the results. Section 3 concludes the paper. 
2  Model and results 
Consider an economy with firms in upstream and downstream industry. Consider the 
following structure of the upstream industry. Assume that there is already one input 
supplier in the upstream industry along with another potential input supplier in the 
upstream industry. We assume that each of the input suppliers has same production 
technology and faces constant marginal cost of production, which is, for simplicity, 
assumed to be zero. However, we assume that the entrant in the upstream industry needs 
to incur an entry cost F  if it decides to enter the upstream industry. If there is no entry 
in the upstream industry, the incumbent input supplier becomes the monopoly in the 
upstream industry and takes its production decisions. Input price will be determined 
from the input demand. In case of entry, these input suppliers act as Cournot oligopolists 
in the upstream industry. Each input supplier decides its volume of production. Price of 
the input will be determined from the demand for input for the total supply of input. We 
assume that there is no further cost associated with input production. We define the 
input suppliers by  1 I  and  2 I . 
  Assume that there are two downstream firms. Denote these firms by  1 F  and  2 F . 
Assume that firm 1 needs one unit of input to produce one unit of output and firm 2 
needs λ units of input to produce one unit of output, where  1 > λ . This implies that firm 
1 has a better production technology compared to firm 2. These firms buy inputs from 
the upstream firms. For simplicity, assume that the downstream firms need this input 
only for their production. Hence, input price behaves as the marginal cost of production 
for each of the downstream firm. These firms compete in the product market like 
Cournot duopolists. Further, it has been assumed that are no other costs associated with 
final goods production. 
  We consider the following game. In stage 1, the downstream firms decide 
whether to engage in licensing or not. In case of licensing,  1 F  gives a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to 2 F .  2 F  accepts the licensing contract if it does not make  2 F  worse-off compared 
to no licensing. Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), Marjit (1990), Mukherjee (2001, 
2002) and many others, we assume that licensing involves up-front fixed fee only. As 
already mentioned in the introduction, the possibility of imitation by the licensee or lack 
of information needed for a provision of royalty in the licensing contract could be the 
reason for licensing with up-front fixed fee only (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 
Rockett, 1990). In stage 2, the entrant upstream firm, i.e.,  2 I , decides whether to enter 
                                                 
3 Mukherjee (2001) has shown the possibility of upward and downward bias on licensing when the firms 
have the option for pre-commitment strategy.   4
the upstream market. In stage 3, upstream firms take their output decisions conditional 
on the decision on entry by  2 I . In stage 4, the downstream firms produce their products 
with the inputs provided by the upstream firms and consider the input prices as given. 
The downstream firms take their production decisions like Cournot duopolists. We 
solve the game through backward induction. 
  Assume that the inverse market demand for the products of  1 F  and  2 F  are given 
by 
 
2 1 q q a P − − = ,             ( 1 )    
 
where,  1 q  and  2 q  are the outputs of  1 F  and  2 F  respectively and P  is the price of the 
final product. 
  Let us first consider the output decisions of the downstream firms. Given the 
input price, denoted by w,  1 F  and  2 F  will produce respectively 
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It is important to note that the output of  2 F  will be zero provided  ) 1 2 ( − ≥ λ
a w . Therefore, 
total demand for input for a given price of input are given by 
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It is clear that there will be no input demand for  a w > . Given this structure of 
the input demand, it is easy to understand that whether the upstream firm(s) will choose 
their outputs in a way to serve both downstream firms (i.e., corresponding input price 
will less than  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a ) or the technologically efficient downstream firm only (i.e., 
corresponding input price will more than  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a ) is also a decision faced by the upstream 
firms. As we will show in the following analysis, if the value of λ  is sufficiently close 
to one, then it is better for the upstream firms to serve both the downstream firms. In 
subsections 2.1 – 2.3, we will do our analysis for the situations where both downstream 
firms will produce positive outputs, which, in turn, implies that optimal price for the 
input will be less than  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a . Further, we will consider symmetric equilibrium only. In  5
section 2.4 we will consider the other situation where the upstream industry will supply 
for the technologically efficient firm only under non-licensing.
4  
2.1 Non-licensing 
Let us first consider the situation under non-licensing in stage 1. 
2.1.1  Entry in upstream industry 
If  2 I  enters into the upstream industry then the firms in the upstream industry will 
compete like Cournot duopolists. Since, we have considered that these firms decide to 
supply both downstream firms then the input demand faced by the upstream firms is 
given by the expression (3).  Therefore, the ith,  2 , 1 = i , firm in the upstream industry 
will maximize the following expression 
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where,  j i ≠  and we use the superscripts to imply the output of the upstream firms. 
Thus, we find that in a symmetric equilibrium each upstream firm will produce  9
2a  and 
total input supply will be  9
4a . Corresponding input price will be  ) 1 ( 3
2
λ +
a . Therefore, 








a − +λ  respectively. 
We have done our analysis under the assumption that the upstream firms will 
produce for both downstream firms. If instead they have produced for the efficient 
downstream firm only then the input demand function would be given by expression (4). 
In this situation, it is easy to check that both total input supply and corresponding input 
price will be  3
a  in a symmetric equilibrium. In that case, the optimal profit of  1 I  and  2 I  
will be  18
2 a  and  ) (18
2
F
a −  respectively. Therefore, each of these firms will prefer to serve 
both downstream firms compared to serving the technologically efficient downstream 





a a  or  3
5 < λ . It is easy to check that if  3
5 < λ  then the 
optimal input price, when producing for both downstream firms, is less than  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a . 
Hence, except for subsection 2.4, we do our analysis for  ) , 1 ( 3
5 ∈ λ .  
When the upstream firms produce for both the downstream firms and the 
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4 It is easy to understand that in case of licensing, upstream industry will supply inputs to both downstream 
firms since both downstream firms will produce with similar technology under licensing.   6
  Note that when the upstream industry is duopoly then, given the optimal price of 
input, both the downstream firms will produce positive output provided  5 < λ . 
  We have done our analysis under the assumption that  2 I  enters in stage 2. 
However, this will happen provided  F
a > + ) 1 ( 27
4
2
λ . But if  F
a < + ) 1 ( 27
4
2
λ  then  1 I  is the 
monopoly producer in the upstream industry since, in this situation,  2 I  does not enter 
the upstream industry.  
  We summarize the above discussion in the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: Suppose,  ) , 1 ( 3
5 ∈ λ  and  F a > + ) 1 ( 27
4
2
λ . In a symmetric equilibrium, profits of  1 F  
and  2 F  are  2
2 2
) 1 ( 81
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a − +λ  respectively. 
 
2.1.2  No-entry in upstream industry 
In the previous subsection we have considered a situation where the entrant in the 
upstream industry enters in stage 2 of the game. This happens for  F
a > + ) 1 ( 27
4
2
λ . In this 
subsection, we will consider the situation for  F a < + ) 1 ( 27
4
2
λ . This implies that the entrant in 
the upstream industry will not enter in stage 2 and the upstream industry will be a 
monopoly of the incumbent input supplier, i.e., of  1 I . Again, we will do our analysis for 
the situation where the monopoly input supplier will provide input for both downstream 
firms, hence, facing the demand for input given by expression (3). 
 Therefore,  here  1 I  will maximize the following expression  
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  In this situation, optimal input production will be  3
a  and corresponding input 
price will be  ) 1 ( λ +
a , which is lower than  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a  for  ) , 1 ( 3




Following the argument of the previous subsection, it is easy to check that the upstream 
monopolist will produce for both the downstream firms rather than producing for the 
efficient downstream firm only when  ) , 1 ( 3
5 ∈ λ .  
  We find that, in this situation, profits of  1 F  and  2 F  are 
 
                                                                                                                                               
5 Both firms in the downstream industry produce positive outputs under non-licensing when  3
5 < λ .   7
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  Note that when the upstream industry is monopoly then, given the optimal price 
of input, both the downstream firms will produce positive output provided  2 < λ . 
  The following lemma summarizes the discussion of this subsection. 
 
Lemma 2: Suppose,  ) , 1 ( 3
5 ∈ λ  and  F
a < + ) 1 ( 27
4
2
λ . In a symmetric equilibrium, profits of  1 F  
and  2 F  are  2
2 2
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Now we do our analysis under the assumption of licensing in stage 1. If licensing occurs 
in stage 1, both firms in the downstream industry will produce with same technology as 
we are considering fixed-fee licensing contract. Hence, in case of licensing we have 
1 = λ .  
  Therefore, we see that if licensing occurs in stage 1 then the entrant will 










a a . Licensing in the 
downstream market increases the possibility of entry in the upstream industry. If 










a l l = =π π .                ( 9 )  
 
  Further, it is important to note that when licensing occurs in stage 1, both 
downstream firms will always produce positive outputs as long as  a w < . Hence, in case 
of licensing, the upstream firms will always produce for both downstream firms 
irrespective of the market structure in the upstream firms. 




. In this 
situation, the upstream firm is the monopoly of  1 I  since the entrant in the upstream 
industry does not enter even if licensing occurs in stage 1. It is easy to check that, in this 
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2.3  Condition for profitable licensing contract 
In the subsections 2.1 and 2.2 we have considered the profits of the downstream firms 
under the assumption of both non-licensing and licensing. In this subsection we will 
examine the situations when licensing is profitable in stage 1. Since we are considering 
licensing contract with up-front fixed fee only, it is enough for us to check industry 
profits with and without licensing to examine the condition for profitable licensing 
contract. 
  Let us first consider the situation where  F
a > + ) 1 ( 27
4
2
λ . In this situation, the 
upstream industry will be duopoly irrespective of the licensing decision in the 
downstream industry. Therefore, profits of the downstream firms under non-licensing 
and licensing are given by the expressions (6) and (9) respectively. Comparing (6) and 
(9) we find that expression (9) will be greater than (6) provided 
2 ) 1 ( 0 − > λ . Since, this 
is not possible for any value of λ , we see that licensing is not optimal when the 
upstream industry becomes duopoly irrespective of the licensing decision in the 
downstream industry. 
  Next, we consider the opposite situation of the above case, i.e., where the 
upstream industry is monopoly irrespective of the licensing decision in the downstream 




. Hence, profits of 
the downstream firms under non-licensing and licensing are given by the expressions (8) 
and (10) respectively. Comparing (8) and (10) we find that expression (10) will be 
greater than (8) provided 
2 ) 1 ( 0 − > λ . Since, this is not possible for any value of λ , we 
see that licensing is not optimal when the upstream industry becomes monopoly 
irrespective of the licensing decision in the downstream industry. 
  Finally, we consider the situation for  ) , ( 27
2
) 1 ( 27
4
2 2 a a F λ + ∈ . Here, the upstream 
industry will be monopoly under non-licensing in the downstream industry but will be 
duopoly under licensing in the downstream industry. Hence, profits of the downstream 
firms under non-licensing and licensing are given by the expressions (8) and (9) 
respectively.  Comparing (8) and (9) we find that expression (9) will be greater than (8) 
provided  
 
λ λ 88 37 37 0
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We see that the right hand side (RHS) of (11) is negative for  1 = λ  and  3
5 = λ . RHS of 
(11) is continuous, quadratic and convex for  ] , 1 [ 3
5 ∈ λ . Hence, we see that condition 
(11) always holds for any  ) , 1 ( 3
5 ∈ λ . This implies that licensing in downstream industry 
is always profitable if licensing changes the market structure of the upstream industry. 
  We summarize the discussion of this subsection in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that  ) , 1 ( 3
5 ∈ λ .  9
(i) If upstream industry is either duopoly or monopoly irrespective of the decision on 
licensing in the downstream industry, i.e., either  F
a > + ) 1 ( 27
4
2




, licensing in 
downstream industry is never optimal. 
(ii) If  ) , ( 27
2
) 1 ( 27
4
2 2 a a F λ + ∈  then licensing will make the upstream industry duopoly but 
without licensing the upstream industry will be monopoly. In this situation, licensing in 
the downstream industry is always optimal.  
 
The above result is in sharp contrast with the previous papers. While ignoring 
the market power of the upstream firms, the previous papers have shown that licensing 
in the downstream industry is profitable provided the initial technologies of these firms 
are sufficiently close (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and Marjit, 1990). Proposition 
1(i) shows that even if the technologies are sufficiently close, licensing is never optimal 
when the upstream market structure is not affected due to licensing in the downstream 
industry. On the other hand, Proposition 1(ii) shows that licensing is always profitable 
when licensing changes the upstream market structure. Therefore, we find that whether 
the presence of market power of the upstream firms creates upward bias or downward 
bias on licensing in the downstream industry depends on the influence of licensing on 
the upstream market structure. Further, unlike Schmitz (2002) we show the possibility 
of both upward and downward bias on licensing and also without any informational 
problem. 
2.4 When  3
5 > λ    
The main result of this paper, which is to show the importance of the upstream market 
structure on licensing in the downstream industry when the upstream firms have market 
power, has been derived in the previous subsection. The previous subsections have 
considered the situation where the firms in the upstream industry produce for both 
downstream firms irrespective of the decision on licensing in the downstream industry. 
This was consistent for  3
5 < λ . 
In this subsection we will briefly examine the situation where, in a symmetric 
equilibrium, the upstream firm(s) produce for the technologically efficient downstream 
firm only under non-licensing. For this we will consider that  3
5 > λ . Hence, in this 
situation, the demand for input is given by the expression (4).  
  It is clear that the possibility of producing for only the efficient downstream firm 
arises in absence of licensing in the downstream industry. But, under licensing in the 
downstream industry, both downstream firms are symmetric and hence, it is trivial that 
the upstream firms will produce for both downstream firms under licensing. 
  Let us first consider the situation where the upstream industry will be duopoly 
irrespective of licensing in the downstream industry. If the upstream industry is duopoly 
and produces for the technologically efficient downstream firm (i.e., facing the input 
demand given by (4)) under non-licensing then the optimal input price will be  3
a , which  10
is lower than  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a  for  ) 2 , (3
5 ∈ λ . Therefore, for  ) 2 , (3
5 ∈ λ , this input price is not 
consistent with the demand for input given in (4). Hence, in this situation, the upstream 
firms needs to produce in a way so that input price cannot be lower than  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a . Hence, 





λ a  and input price will be  ) 1 2 ( − λ
a . In a 
symmetric equilibrium, both upstream firms will share this total input supply equally. 
Therefore, under non-licensing (constrained) optimal profits of  1 I  and  2 I  will be 
2
2
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λ
λ  respectively. Therefore, for these values of λ , whether the 
upstream firms will supply for both downstream firms or for the efficient downstream 
firm only depends on the unconstrained profits of the upstream firms, while supplying 
for both downstream firms and the constrained profits of the upstream firms, while 
supplying for the efficient downstream firm only. It is easy to check that, for these 
values of λ , the upstream firms prefer to supply for the technologically efficient 
downstream firm. Therefore, when  ) 2 , (3
5 ∈ λ ,  2 I  will enter the upstream industry under 
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λ , profit of the technologically efficient 
firm and hence, downstream industry profit under non-licensing will be  2
2 2
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λ a  and input price will be 
) 1 2 ( − λ
a . But, in case of licensing, downstream industry profit will be  81
8
2 a  (see expression 
(9)). Comparing the downstream industry profits under non-licensing and licensing, we 
find that here licensing is not profitable. 
Now, we consider the situation for  2 > λ . From the above discussion it is clear 
that here the upstream firms will receive unconstrained optimal profit even if producing 
for the technologically efficient downstream firm. Here, the profits of  1 I  and  2 I  will be 
18
2 a  and  F
a − 18
2




, where  27
2
18 ) 1 ( 27
4
2 2 2 a a a < < +λ . Further, we have  18 ) 1 2 ( 2







λ  for  2 > λ . 
 So,  if  F
a > 18
2
 then the upstream industry will be duopoly. It is easy to check that, 
in this situation, profit of the efficient downstream firm and hence, industry profit will 
be  9
2 a  under non-licensing. But, in case of licensing, downstream industry profit will be 
81
8
2 a  (see expression (9)), which is less than the downstream industry profit without 
licensing, i.e.,  9
2 a . Hence, in this situation, licensing is not optimal in the downstream 
industry. 
  The above discussion also shows that if the values of λ  are sufficiently 
high so that the upstream firms produce for the efficient downstream firm only, it  11




2 2 a a < , the incentive for entry in the upstream industry is still lower under non-
licensing compared to licensing. 
Let us now consider the situation where the upstream industry will be monopoly 
irrespective of licensing in the downstream industry. This will happen if the cost of 




. If  3
5 > λ  then the 
upstream monopolist always finds it optimal to produce for the technologically efficient 
downstream firm.
6 In this situation, it is easy to find that optimal profit of the efficient 
downstream firm under non-licensing is  16
2 a , which is greater than the downstream 
industry profit under licensing, which is  18
2 a  (see expression (10)). Hence, here also 
licensing is not optimal in downstream market. 
  Lastly, consider the situation where the upstream industry will be monopoly 
without licensing but will be duopoly with licensing. This will happen when 
) , ( 27
2
) 1 2 ( 2







λ  and  ) 2 , (3
5 ∈ λ  or  ) , ( 27
2
18
2 2 a a F ∈  and  2 > λ . Therefore, from the above 
discussions it is clear that, in this situation, downstream industry profits under non-
licensing and licensing will be  16
2 a  and  81
8
2 a  respectively. Here licensing is always be 
optimal as  16 81
8
2 2 a a > . Hence, we find conclusions similar to Proposition 1 even if the 
upstream firm(s) produce for the technologically efficient downstream firm only in case 
of non-licensing. 
  We summarize the above discussions in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Consider that  3
5 > λ  so that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the upstream 
firm(s) supply for the technologically efficient downstream firm only. The qualitative 
results of Proposition 1 hold even for these values of λ .  
 
  Proposition 2 has an interesting implication. We find that if licensing in the 
downstream industry changes the market structure of the upstream industry then 
licensing is profitable even for  2 > λ . This implies that licensing is profitable even for 
those technological differences of the downstream firms where only technologically 
efficient firm produces the final good in absence of licensing. Thus, we show that even 
if the technologically efficient downstream firm becomes the monopoly in the final 
goods market in absence of licensing, licensing is still optimal since it encourages entry 
of a new firm in the upstream industry. This is in sharp contrast to the previous literature 
on licensing (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Marjit, 1990 and Mukherjee, 2001) 
where it has been shown that if the technologically efficient firm is monopoly or near 
                                                 
6 Further, it is clear from subsection 2.1.2 that when  2 > λ  and there is monopolist in the upstream 
industry then the technologically inefficient downstream firm will not produce under the optimal input 
price even if the upstream firm intends to produce for both downstream firms.  12
monopoly in the product market then licensing is not optimal. The reason for this 
striking difference between this paper and the previous papers is that here licensing 
changes the market structure of the input market, which, in turn, reduces input price and 
makes licensing profitable. 
3 Conclusion 
Researchers have already addressed several issues on technology licensing. While they 
have addressed the importance of informational structure and competition between the 
licenser and licensee, the literature is silent on the implications of vertically separated 
industries when the upstream firms have significant market power. In this paper, in a 
vertically separated industry with successive Cournot duopolies, we examine the 
possibility of licensing in downstream industry. We consider that the upstream firms 
have significant market power and licensing involves up-front fixed fee only. 
  We show that licensing in the downstream industry increases the incentive for 
entry in the upstream industry. However, whether licensing in the downstream industry 
is optimal depends on the market structure of the upstream industry. We show that if the 
market structure in the upstream industry remains same irrespective of the decision on 
licensing in the downstream industry then licensing is not profitable in the downstream 
industry. Licensing in the downstream industry is profitable provided licensing 
encourages new firms to enter the upstream industry and enhances competition in the 
upstream industry.    
  We also show that a monopolist firm in the downstream industry has the 
incentive for technology licensing if licensing in the downstream industry changes the 
market structure of the upstream industry. Higher competition in the upstream industry 
helps to reduce input prices and makes licensing profitable.  
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